后股权分置背景下CEO更换与投资者保护:动因及效应研究  

The Drives and Effects of CEO Turnover for Investor Protection:Evidence from China′s Listed Companies in Post Split-share Structure Era

作　　者：张宏亮[1,2] 崔学刚[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京工商大学商学院,北京100048 [2]南开大学公司治理研究中心,天津300071

出　　处：《财贸研究》2010年第6期120-128,共9页Finance and Trade Research

基　　金：国家社科基金项目"会计信息质量与投资者保护效果研究"(08CJY008);北京市教委面上项目"金融危机背景下会计稳健性的投资者保护机制及效果研究"(SM201010011001);北京市属高等学校人才强教计划资助项目"会计与投资者保护"(PHR20100512)

摘　　要：以中国后股权分置为背景,从公司业绩角度研究引起CEO变更的原因及其变更的业绩效应和价值效应。实证研究结果显示,亏损及会计收益下降会显著地带来CEO的变更,而盈利企业在业绩下降时CEO变更的敏感性更强。同时发现,CEO变更具有较强的价值效应,能够显著提升公司的市场价值,但对会计业绩的提升作用不明显;对亏损企业来说,其业绩效应和价值效应都非常显著,且远大于盈利企业。Using the post split-share structure of China as the background,this paper researches into the causes of CEO turnover and the performance effect and value effect of the turnover from the perspective of performance.The empirical study shows that loss and decline of accounting income will cause CEO turnover significantly,the probability of CEO turnover for firms with profit has higher sensitivity while its performance declines than that of those loss-making firms.CEO turnover has stronger value effect,which can increase the firms′ market value significantly,but not for accounting performance.For the loss-making firms,both the value effect and performance effect are all evident,and far greater than those of profit-making firms.

关 键 词：CEO更换 公司治理 投资者保护 股权分置改革 

分 类 号：F272.3[经济管理—企业管理]