管理者政治联系与过度自信  

The Executives' Political Network and Overconfidence

作　　者：文芳[1] 

机构地区：[1]厦门大学,厦门361005

出　　处：《中国经济问题》2011年第1期80-90,共11页China Economic Studies

摘　　要：本文以2006—2008年我国沪深A股上市公司为样本,在对管理者政治联系形成路径分类的基础上,实证检验了其对管理者过度自信的影响。结果发现,管理者政治联系对其过度自信具有正向促进作用,与来自政府(部队)工作经历形成的政治联系相比,来自人大代表和政协委员身份的政治联系更易于导致过度自信,在非国有上市公司中更是如此。当公司所在地市场化进程不同时,上述影响有所不同。研究认为,虽然管理者政治联系有助于缓解制度约束(产权性质、市场化进程不平衡)给企业发展带来的障碍,但随之产生的过度自信会导致管理者更为关注"关系能力",并不利于企业核心能力的培植和可持续发展。Based on the samples of listed companies in China from 2006 to 2008, the paper empirically studies the effect of executives＇ political network on their overconfidence. The results show that executives＇ political network positively affects their overconfidence. Compared with the executives＇ political network resulted from working experience in government or army, that coming from their political status of deputy to national people＇s congress or of political consultative committee members has greater influence on overconfidence. It also shows that the marketization is an important factor in influencing executives＇ overconfidence.

关 键 词：政治联系 过度自信 产权性质 市场化进程 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理] F123.15[经济管理—国民经济] F224