行动的解释：理由、原因和目的--戴维森对传统的复兴及其缺失的维度  

Explanation of Action:Reasons,Causes and Teleology——A Missing Dimension in Davidson's Revival of an Old Tradition

作　　者：田平[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]北京师范大学价值与文化研究中心 [2]北京师范大学哲学与社会学学院,北京100875

出　　处：《学术月刊》2011年第1期47-53,共7页Academic Monthly

摘　　要：戴维森的事件因果论,将行动的能动性还原为欲望、信念、意图等心理状态或事件对于行动的因果效力。将行动的理由看作行动的原因,在一定意义上使得关于行动的一种传统看法得到复兴。然而,作为戴维森行动哲学之形而上学基础的异常一元论所遭遇的副现象主义的困难,向我们提示了只从心理和物理两个维度理解行动可能会带来的问题。亚里士多德在关于行动的讨论中,除了理由和原因两个维度以外,还有一个目的论的维度。亚里士多德关于生命活动的合目的性的思想,一方面构成了行动的理由解释之为因果解释的基础,同时也蕴涵了生命与心的连续性论题。我们虽然不能在亚里士多德那里找到解决当代问题的现成方案,但是,亚里士多德的方案对于我们反思当代行动哲学所采取的某种意义上的二元论预设以及由此带来的困难,并在自然主义的方向上推进关于行动的研究,具有积极的意义。In Davidson＇s theory of event causation, the problem of agency is reduced to the problem of causal efficacy of psychological states or events such as desires, beliefs and intentions. In taking rea- sons to be causes of action, Davidson revived an old tradition. However, Davidson＇s anomalous mon- ism as the metaphysical basis of his action theory is criticized as making mental properties epiphenom- ena. This suggests that it may be problematic to analyze action merely from the psychological and physical view points. In Aristotle＇s discussion of action, besides reasons and causes, teleology is an important dimension. Aristotle＇s teleological view of life provides a basis for reason explanation and causal explanation of action, and also implies the life and mind continuity thesis. Although we may not find a ready solution to the contemporary problem of action in Aristotle＇s discussions, his ideas may indicate a way to going out of the contemporary difficulties which are due in part to some kind of dualist presuppositions.

关 键 词：行动 行动的理由 行动的原因 目的论 生命与心的连续性论题 

分 类 号：B712.6[哲学宗教—外国哲学]