不对称信息下服务外包中的客户企业参与机制  

The Mechanism of Customer Enterprise Participation in Service Outsourcing under Asymmetric Information

作　　者：宋寒[1] 但斌[1] 张旭梅[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400044

出　　处：《系统管理学报》2011年第1期56-62,共7页Journal of Systems & Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70871128);国家863计划重点项目课题(2007AA040801)

摘　　要：建立有效的客户参与机制能降低服务成本,提高外包服务项目成功率。针对不对称信息下,客户企业参与外包服务生产后,服务商是否会努力工作,以及如何激励服务商努力工作问题,建立了客户企业参与下的委托代理模型,分析了客户企业参与行为对服务商工作努力程度、收益共享合约的影响。研究表明,当客户企业参与行为与服务商的工作存在互补关系时,客户参与度与服务商工作努力程度正相关,且随着客户参与的增加与之匹配的收入共享激励系数应增加;反之,客户参与度与服务商工作努力负相关,且随着客户参与的增加与之匹配的收入共享激励系数应减少。最后,通过数值算例验证了相关结论。The effective mechanism for customer participation in services outsourcing can reduce costs,improve the success rate of outsourcing service.Focused on service provider whether works hard and customer enterprise how to incent service provider after customer enterprise participates in service outsourcing under asymmetric information,a principal-agent model with participation of customer enterprise is established.Based on the model the impact of customer participation on service provider＇s effort and the revenue-sharing contract is analyzed.The conclusions imply that if customer＇s participation and service provider＇s effort are complementary,then increased participation can motivate service provider＇s effort and the revenue-sharing proportion should be increased.Otherwise,the increased participation can＇t motivate service provider＇s effort and the revenue-sharing proportion should be decreased when the customer＇s participation and the service provider＇s effort are substituted.At last,the conclusions are proved by a numerical example.

关 键 词：道德风险 服务外包 客户参与 激励机制 

分 类 号：F270.7[经济管理—企业管理]