政府在食品安全监管中的职能转变与策略选择——基于北京市场的案例调研  

Function Conversion and Strategy Choice of Government in Food Safety Supervision:A Case Study in Beijing Market

作　　者：任燕[1] 安玉发[1] 多喜亮 

机构地区：[1]中国农业大学经济管理学院,北京100083 [2]北京市海淀区马连洼街道办事处,北京100193

出　　处：《公共管理学报》2011年第1期16-25,123,共10页Journal of Public Management

基　　金：国家科技支撑计划项目(2008BADA0B08);中国农业大学2010年度研究生科研创新专项

摘　　要：基于对我国食品安全监管现状的认识,本文提出了以政府为主导的食品安全控制体系向以企业为主导的食品安全保证体系的发展方向;以农产品批发市场为例,通过案例调研进一步阐述传统监管体系在实际运行中存在的问题及转变政府职能的必要性,如监管重复化、程式化和低效率,市场执行效果不好,抽检规范化、标准化和信息追溯可信度低等;并通过博弈模型分析政府和企业(市场)进行食品安全监管和控制的行为决策过程,找出通过政府职能的转变而促使企业从"反应型食品安全监管"向"自主型食品安全监管"转变的关键所在与有效路径,为提升我国食品安全监管效率、创新食品安全监管模式提供思路。Based on the review of the status and characteristics of China's food safety supervision system, the paper proposes a new developing trend of food safety supervision, which is the transition from the traditional government-led 'reactive model' to the enterprise-led 'autonomous model'. This paper takes agriculture product wholesale market as an example, and explores the operational problems of traditional supervision pattern and the necessity of converting government functions, such as regulatory duplication, low efficiency in stylization, low standardization in sampling and low credibility in traceability etc. At last, game model is used to analyze the behaviors of government and enterprise (market) in supervising and controlling food safety and their decision-making processes, in order to find out the path to convert government functions and change enterprises from 'reactive' supervision to 'autonomous' supervision, and provide a new way of improving our food safety supervisory efficiency and making more innovative regulatory patterns.

关 键 词：食品安全监管 政府 职能转变 策略选择 

分 类 号：D035[政治法律—政治学]