政府规制下RSC的激励研究  

The Research on Incentive Mechanism of RSC under Government Regulation

作　　者：王玉燕[1] 申亮[2] 

机构地区：[1]山东财政学院工商管理学院,山东济南250014 [2]山东经济学院财政金融学院,山东济南250014

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2011年第1期173-178,共6页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究项目基金资助项目(09YJC630141);山东省自然科学基金资助项目(ZR2009HQ002);山东省科技攻关项目资助(2010G0020814);山东财政学院科研计划项目资助

摘　　要：本文用委托-代理理论讨论了政府规制下逆向供应链的激励问题,在补贴、惩罚为独立的参量时,政府可选择的激励方案有三种:(1)奖励、惩罚同步实施的方案;(2)仅实施惩罚的方案;(3)仅实施奖励的方案,通过对三种不同方案的分析比较,得出:奖励、惩罚同步实施的方案是政府最优的激励方案。同时文章还分析了信息不对称所带来的代理成本问题。所得结论,对政府环境部门在制定环境补贴政策和决策环境监督水平具有重要的理论和现实意义,为进一步研究更加复杂的政府和企业的合约与监督机制奠定了理论基础。This paper studies the incentive mechanism of RSC under government regulation.On the condition of subsidies and punishment serving as independent parameters,the government may choose three incentive programs： the first is of subsidies and punishment,the second is only punishment,and the third is only subsidies.We can educe that from the comparison of three different programs,the first program is the optimal incentive one.Then,this paper analyses the agency cost problem brought by asymmetric information.The results have important theoretical and practical significance for government decision-making of environmental policy.And the results lay the theoretical foundation for further studying government and enterprise contracts.

关 键 词：逆向供应链 激励机制 政府规制 委托-代理 

分 类 号：F273[经济管理—企业管理]