资本结构、管理层防御与上市公司高管薪酬水平  

Capital Structure,Managerial Entrenchment and Managerial Compensation Level in Chinese Listed Firms

作　　者：王志强[1] 张玮婷[1] 顾劲尔[1] 

机构地区：[1]厦门大学管理学院,361005

出　　处：《会计研究》2011年第2期72-78,97,共7页Accounting Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(批准号:70972111;70632001)的资助

摘　　要：将人力资本破产成本引入研究框架是高管薪酬理论研究的新突破。其他条件相同时,公司的资产负债率越高,破产可能性就越大,高层管理者因而要求更高的薪酬水平以补偿所需承担的更高的人力资本破产成本。可见,公司资本结构因暗涵了人力资本破产成本,可作为衡量高管薪酬是否合理的依据。本文以2004-2007年上市公司为样本,从资本结构的视角来审视上市公司的高管薪酬,并探究公司管理层防御现象。研究发现:(1)我国上市公司普遍存在管理层防御现象;(2)平均而言,国有企业高管薪酬水平高于民营企业,但资本结构相近,因此,相比于其所承担的人力资本破产成本,国有企业高管的薪酬水平太高了;(3)与民营企业相比,国有企业存在着更为严重的管理层防御问题。Taking the human capital bankruptcy costs into the framework of managerial compensation is an important breakthrough of theoretical research in managerial compensation.Holding other conditions the same,the higher the leverage of firms,the higher the probability of bankruptcy and hence the human capital bankruptcy costs will be higher for managers,who as a result require higher compensation for burdening higher costs.Capital structure implying human capital bankruptcy costs can be a measurement of compensation level.This paper use panel data regression to research on the managerial compensation from the perspective of capital structure and management entrenchment by taking 2004~2007 listed companies as the sample.Our results show that ①There is management entrenchment in Chinese listed companies;②On average,the managerial compensation level of State Owned Enterprises(SOEs)is higher than that of private companies;comparing to the human capital bankruptcy costs,the compensation of SOEs' managers is too high when holding other conditions the same.③Compared to private companies,we conclude that the managerial entrenchment is more severe in SOEs.

关 键 词：高管薪酬 资本结构 人力资本破产成本 管理层防御 

分 类 号：F272.92[经济管理—企业管理] F275[经济管理—国民经济]