外部权益保护、控制权利益与委托-代理理论  

Investor Protection,Benefits of Control and the Reconstructing of Theory of Principal-Agent Problem

作　　者：徐晓东[1] 王霞[2] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海200052 [2]华东师范大学商学院,上海200241

出　　处：《系统管理学报》2010年第6期601-609,共9页Journal of Systems & Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70772062;70872107);国家社会科学基金资助项目(08BJY024)

摘　　要：传统的委托-代理理论模型框架仅是企业在不存在内部人控制条件下的一种理想架构,在现实生活中企业总是或多或少普遍地存在着内部人控制的现象,致使这一理论对企业的许多问题缺乏解释力。构建了在企业存在完全的内部人控制的条件下新的委托-代理理论模型框架,并指出它与传统的委托-代理理论模型框架一样,均为委托-代理理论的2种极端状态,只有两者一起才能完成对委托-代理理论的完整表述。以此为基础,研究了在保证公司持续经营的情况下,其内部人和外部股东对企业剩余进行分配的经济边界、均衡路径及其变化,指出外部股东必须获得其投资风险对应的市场机会收益既是作为经理人的内部人进行职位防护的经济边界,也是作为大股东的内部人进行掏空或支持的经济边界。This paper develops a new framework for analyzing the principal-agent problem in which insider control is absolutely dominant in a firm.We argue that both the new framework and the classical one in which insider control is completely not existed are necessary to capture the two fundamental states of principal-agent problem and both of them are playing an important role in allocating firm residuals between insiders and outsiders.Our analysis shows that how the residuals are allocated between insiders and outsiders when control rights are change and what the critical benefits are for both of the two interest stakes in two ideal states of principal-agent problem.

关 键 词：委托-代理理论 内部人控制 企业剩余分配 控制权利益 

分 类 号：F270.5[经济管理—企业管理]