总经理更替、管理层持股与高管团队重组——基于上市公司的实证  

General Manager Replacement,Managerial Stockholding and Executire Team Restmcturing——Based on the Empirical Listed Company

作　　者：刘新民[1] 王垒[1] 吴士健[1] 

机构地区：[1]山东科技大学经济管理学院,山东青岛266510

出　　处：《技术经济与管理研究》2011年第5期55-59,共5页Journal of Technical Economics & Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70971078);教育部人文社会科学研究项目(09YJA630089);山东省软科学研究项目(2008RAK117);山东省博士后基金(2010BSE06034);山东科技大学研究生科技创新基金项目(YCA100341)

摘　　要：本文对总经理变更后的高管团队重组现象进行了研究,以管理层持股为调节变量,从更替类型、继任者来源等方面构建了理论假设,并利用上市公司年报数据进行了实证检验。研究发现,高管团队重组与总经理非常规更替显著正相关,而与总经理常规更替无显著关系;与总经理外部继任呈显著正相关,与总经理内部继任无显著关系;与管理持股比例呈强显著负相关关系;高管持股比例反向调节非常规更替与高管团队重组的关系,对常规更替调节不显著;同时反向调节外部继任与高管团队重组关系,正向调节内部继任与高管团队重组关系。Studied the phenomenon of top management team recomposition after general manger turnover,in terms of turnover style,the source of successor we set up new theoretical hypothesis with managerial ownership as a moderator and test them with data of china＇s listed companies.Some conclusions are drawn from this emprical research.Firstly,top management team recomposition is positive related to the general manger＇s forced turnover,no significant relationship with common turnover.Secondly,top management team recomposition is positive related to the secession of outsider,no significant relationship with the secession of insider.Thirdly,top management team recomposition is negative related to the managerial ownership.Specially,managerial ownership negatively influence the relationship between general manger＇s forced turnover and top management team recomposition,no influence the relationship between general manger＇s common turnover and top management team recomposition,at the same time negatively influence the relationship between the secession of outsider and top management team recomposition,positively influence the relationship between the secession of insider and top management team recomposition.

关 键 词：总经理变更 管理层持股 高管团队 团队重组 

分 类 号：F272.9[经济管理—企业管理]