最终控制人、高管薪酬与技术创新  

Ultimate Controlling Shareholder,Manager's Compensation and Technology Innovation

作　　者：夏芸[1] 唐清泉[2] 

机构地区：[1]暨南大学国际商学院,广东珠海519070 [2]中山大学管理学院,广东广州510275

出　　处：《山西财经大学学报》2011年第5期86-92,共7页Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目<我国企业R&D创新投入的风险与有效性研究>(70772084);广东省普通高校人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目<企业研发创新的激励机制研究>(09JDXM79001)的阶段性研究成果

摘　　要：以2002～2006年沪深上市公司为样本,研究了不同产权背景下高管薪酬与技术创新选择之间的关系。研究发现:高管股权激励越大,高管越倾向于自主创新;会计短期业绩越多,高管越倾向于技术引进;在中央控股的企业中,采取股权激励作为高管主要薪酬方式确实比会计短期业绩更有利于自主创新;地方国企的技术创新方式选择与高管薪酬的长短期激励方式有关;对于私有企业而言,高管薪酬对企业技术创新的影响并不明显。Based on the companies during 2002 to 2006,the authors study the relationship between manager＇s compensation and innovation under different property rights.The empirical results of this paper are as follows： independent innovation is positively associated with the CEO＇s stock ownership,but negatively with the short-term performance as compensation.The more short-term performance as CEO＇s compensation is,the greater tendency is to take technological innovation.In the central holding enterprise,stock ownership as CEO＇s compensation is more efficient than short-term performance as CEO＇s compensation for manager to take independent innovation.Type of innovation selection depends much on short-term or long-term performance as CEO＇s compensation in local state-owned enterprises.However in private enterprises,no evidences indicate that manager＇s compensation can have some effects on enterprise＇s technological innovation.

关 键 词：最终控制人 高管薪酬 自主创新 技术引进 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]