猪肉供应链各主体间基于安全成本的动态进化博弈研究  

Study on the Dynamic Evolution Games Between the Subjects in Pork Supply Chain based on Safety Cost

作　　者：林朝朋[1] 刘广海[2] 

机构地区：[1]厦门城市职业学院经济管理学部,福建厦门361008 [2]广州大学物流与运输研究所,广东广州510006

出　　处：《物流工程与管理》2011年第4期100-102,共3页Logistics Engineering and Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(51008087)

摘　　要：猪肉供应链各主体间存在着基于安全成本的博弈问题。文中运用进化动态博弈模型建立猪肉供应链各主体间基于安全成本的博弈关系,对下游主体监督上游主体的稳定状态进行分析,揭示双方的行为特征及其稳定状态,为猪肉供应链各主体的安全管理提供参考。The games existed between the subjects in pork supply chain based on safety cost.In this paper,the dynamic evolution games are applied to build the game model of subjects in pork supply chain based on safety cost and the stable state of supervision from downstream subjects to upstream subjects are also analyzed to reveal their behavioral characterristics and its stable state,which can be used to assist the safety management for the subjects of pork supply chain.

关 键 词：供应链 猪肉 安全成本 动态进化博弈 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]