高管薪酬变化与并购代理动机的实证分析——基于国有与民营上市公司治理结构的比较研究  

Acquisition,Corporate Governance and Executive Rewards:A Comparative Study between State-owned Enterprises and Private Enterprises

作　　者：李小燕[1] 陶军 

机构地区：[1]北京化工大学经济管理学院,北京100081 [2]中诚信国际信用评级有限责任公司,北京100031

出　　处：《中国软科学》2011年第5期122-128,共7页China Soft Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70802006);教育部人文社会科学研究项目(08JA630009)

摘　　要：现有研究不区分控股股东所有权性质,笼统给出高管薪酬变化与并购业绩无关的结论很可能有失偏颇。基于国有与民营上市公司并购前后高管薪酬的变化及其影响因素的实证分析发现:在相对宽松的公司治理环境下,国企高管具备利用并购增加个人收益的动机和条件,高管薪酬变化与并购业绩无关;而民营企业高管在相对激烈的市场竞争及严格的内部监管环境下,提高并购业绩或许是增加个人收益的更好选择,高管薪酬变化与并购业绩相关。研究深化了对我国上市公司治理结构的认识,对进一步研究公司高管的行为动机及其影响因素具有一定的参考价值,同时对于企业高管的薪酬契约设计亦有一定的借鉴意义。Without considering the nature of shareholder ownership,the conclusion that executive rewards have no relationship with acquisition performance is likely to bias.Under Chinese special institutional environment,there are great differences on corporate governance between state-owned enterprises and private enterprises.In order to examine whether there are different acquisition motives between those two types of enterprise,we focus on the change of executive rewards around acquisition.The results show that the executives of state-owned enterprises can increase their rewards by means of increasing firm size.For senior executives of private enterprises,performance improvement is positive related with their compensation rather than firm size caused by acquisitions.This study helps to understand the corporate governance and executive behavior of China＇s listed companies.

关 键 词：企业并购 高管薪酬 代理成本 公司治理 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]