应对气候变化政府间博弈行为模型研究  

Game Behavior Model of Government for Addressing Climate Change

作　　者：张鹏飞[1] 李克平[1] 王元丰[2] 

机构地区：[1]北京交通大学轨道交通控制与安全国家重点实验室,北京100044 [2]北京交通大学土木建筑工程学院,北京100044

出　　处：《科学技术与工程》2011年第21期5115-5119,共5页Science Technology and Engineering

基　　金：轨道交通控制与安全国家重点实验室重点课题(RCS2008ZZ001;RCS2010ZZ001)资助

摘　　要：气候保护是一种维持公共资源的问题。世界上的所有国家都应该为应对气候变化而采取行动。然而,这样的行动实际上是一个博弈的过程,在这个过程中每个国家在约束条件下选择参与减排或是放弃减排。提出一种世界各国应对气候变化博弈过程的模拟模型。模型中,我们假设每个国家是分布在空间网络中的一点,并提出一种新的演化规则来模拟各个国家的博弈过程。数值模拟的结果表明,受到国际基金组织的奖惩政策影响的国家在是否协作参与减排的问题上的决策会出现一些局域性的波动。Climate protection is a problem of sustaining a public resources. All countries of the world should take action to address climate change. However, such a action is actually a game process, where each country choose to participate or give up the emissions reduction. A new game model is presented for all countries to deal with climate change. The countries of the world are considered as players who are distributed on an assumed spatial network, and a new evolution rule is proposed to simulate the game process among players. Simulation results indicate that players may change their choices on account of the international incentives. Some local oscillations can be found where part of the players change their decisions.

关 键 词：博弈理论 气候变化 减排奖励 

分 类 号：X22[环境科学与工程—环境科学]