消费者策略行为视角下短生命周期产品的定价机制研究  

The Study of Pricing Mechanism For Short Life Cycle Product Under Strategic Consumer Behavior

作　　者：刘晓峰[1,2] 徐贤浩[2] 

机构地区：[1]中南财经政法大学工商学院,湖北武汉430074 [2]华中科技大学管理学院,湖北武汉430074

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2011年第4期152-158,共7页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：教育部青年教师基本科研业务项目(31540910803)

摘　　要：本文从消费者策略行为出发,通过运用经典的Stackelberg博弈模型,讨论面对消费者策略行为时,短生命周期产品厂商如何有效进行收益管理。结论表明,在短生命周期产品收益管理过程中,忽视消费者策略行为会导致利润的严重损失,厂商应根据库存和消费者的理性预期制定相应的价格决策。当库存较少时,厂商基本可以忽略消费者策略行为而制定较高价格;当库存相对较多,厂商的最优定价决策依赖于理性预期均衡;当库存非常充裕时,最优定价决策与消费者折扣因子紧密相关。厂商可通过适当的库存数量增加产品缺货风险,而减少消费者策略行为的不利影响。这对短生命周期产品的收益管理具有一定的现实意义。In this paper,we use Stachelberg game theory model to consider how a monopolistic firm of short life cycle product manages the revenue in the perspective of the strategic consumer behavior.The conclusion shows that the firm will leave a lot of money on the table if it ignores the consumer＇s strategic behavior.The firm should make the optimal price policy based on the inventory and consumers＇ expectation.When the inventory is small,the firm can ignore the strategic consumer behavior and make a high price policy;When the inventory is relative large,the firm＇s optimal profit will be realized under the only rational equilibrium;when the inventory is enough,the firm＇s optimal price policy is related with the consumer＇s rational expectation and value discount.The firm can use suitable inventory controlling to enhance the risk of stock out,and avoid the adverse impact of the consumer＇s strategic behavior.The conclusion is useful for the revenue management of the short life cycle product.

关 键 词：动态定价 策略行为 理性预期 NASH均衡 

分 类 号：F272.3[经济管理—企业管理]