上市方式与控股股东资金占用——基于家族上市公司的分析  

The Approaches of Listing and the Fund Occupation of Controlling Shareholders:An Analysis Based on Family Listed Companies

作　　者：吴从锋[1] 赵卫斌[2] 张阳武[3] 

机构地区：[1]华中科技大学管理学院,湖北武汉430074 [2]南京大学商学院,江苏南京210093 [3]华南农业大学经济管理学院,广东广州510642

出　　处：《南方金融》2011年第7期54-57,29,共5页South China Finance

摘　　要：本文以资金占用衡量利益侵占,以家族上市公司为研究对象,通过结合我国证券市场的发展背景,将家族上市公司按照上市方式划分为直接上市和间接上市两种类型,研究家族企业上市方式与家族控股股东利益侵占的关系。实证研究表明,相比通过IPO直接上市的公司,以间接方式上市的家族企业控股股东资金占用程度更高。本文认为,上市方式差异的根源在于其监管政策的不同,导致盈余信息质量的下降,因此,有必要在政策层面加强对间接上市企业的监管,从源头上降低控股股东的资金占用动机。In this paper,with the interest expropriation measured by fund occupations,to study family listed companies in the view of the development of the Chinese security markets,we divide family listed companies into two different types,that is,direct listed companies and indirect listed companies,and try to reveal the relationship between the approaches of listing and the fund occupation of family controlling shareholders.Our empirical study shows that compared to direct listed companies through IPO,the controlling shareholders of family enterprises have occupied more funds.As a conclusion,we think that the differences between the approaches of listing arise from the regulation rules which have lowered the quality of profits information.Therefore,it is necessary to reinforce the regulation on indirect listed companies so as to reduce the motivation of fund occupation from where the problem arises.

关 键 词：公司治理 上市方式 家族企业 资金占用 

分 类 号：F276.5[经济管理—企业管理] F832.51[经济管理—国民经济]