薪酬管制、薪酬委员会与公司绩效  

Compensation Regulation,Remuneration Committee and Corporate Performance

作　　者：高文亮[1] 罗宏[2] 

机构地区：[1]河北金融学院会计系,河北保定071051 [2]西南财经大学会计学院,四川成都611130

出　　处：《山西财经大学学报》2011年第8期84-91,共8页Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家社科基金项目"我国垄断企业高管薪酬机制研究"(10XJL012)的阶段性成果

摘　　要：以2001～2008年上市公司为样本,研究发现,薪酬委员会的设置与高管薪酬正相关,薪酬委员会的设置并没有显著影响上市公司薪酬业绩敏感性,这意味着薪酬委员会的作用有待加强。国有企业薪酬委员会的设置与公司绩效正相关,在非国有企业样本中并没有发现类似证据。这可能是由于国有企业存在着薪酬管制。薪酬委员会的设置使高管薪酬趋于市场化,起到了薪酬激励的作用,进而影响了国有企业的绩效。Based on the sample of listed companies in 2001-2008,this paper finds that the setting of Remuneration Committee is positively related to executive pay.At the same time,the authors find that it has no significant effect on pay-performance sensitivity in listed companies.This means that the role of the Remuneration Committee needs to be strengthened.The setting of Remuneration Committee in state-owned enterprises is positively related to corporate performance,while there is no similar evidence in the non-state-owned enterprises.Because of compensation regulation,the setting of the Remuneration Committee makes the executive compensation of state-owned enterprises tend to be market-oriented,and plays an important role on the incentive compensation and affects the performance of state-owned enterprises.

关 键 词：薪酬管制 薪酬委员会 公司绩效 业绩敏感性 

分 类 号：F832[经济管理—金融学]