股改前后上市公司管理层股权激励问题的比较研究  

Study on the Stock Incentive for Management of Listed Company before and after the Reform of Stock Structure

作　　者：吴婧[1] 

机构地区：[1]扬州大学商学院,江苏扬州225009

出　　处：《南京财经大学学报》2011年第3期76-80,共5页Journal of Nanjing University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：教育部人文社科研究规划基金项目<全流通条件下的国有股权管理研究>(07JA630008);江苏社科基金项目<股改后上市公司国有股权管理研究>(07EYC067)阶段性研究成果

摘　　要：截至2007年,我国上市公司已基本完成了股权分置改革,实现了股份的全流通,解决了大小股东之间利益不一致的问题。股权激励作为一种对管理层激励的有效方式,可以达到吸引人才、降低代理成本以及有效减少管理层短期行为的目的,在公司激励机制中发挥着重要的作用。本文首先从股改前上市公司管理层股权激励的特点入手,讨论股权分置改革给股权激励带来的主要变化以及股改后管理层股权激励存在的对价依据不明确、股权激励被滥用、管理层短视行为等问题,分析存在问题的原因后,提出了全流通背景下股权激励措施的完善措施。Shareholder Structure Reform has been basically completed by the end of 2007 to implement full circulation of stocks and to balance the interests between majority shareholders and minority shareholders. Stock incentive which could attract talents, reduce agency cost and short-term behavior of management was one of the most important inventive mechanisms. The characteristics of stock incentive before the reform and the changes of stock incentive after the reform were discussed. There were several problems of management stock incentive after the reform such as short-term behavior. The suggestion was given to improve the stock incentive mechanism under full circulation.

关 键 词：股权分置改革 股权激励 管理层激励 全流通 

分 类 号：F276[经济管理—企业管理]