引入自有品牌的供应链激励机制设计研究  

Study on Supply Chain Incentive Mechanism Design with the Introduction of Private Brand

作　　者：谢会芹[1] 

机构地区：[1]河北科技师范学院工商管理学院,河北秦皇岛066004

出　　处：《物流技术》2011年第8期108-111,共4页Logistics Technology

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70371045)

摘　　要：针对引入自有品牌的供应链激励机制设计问题,首先在对称信息和非对称信息下建立由两个制造商和一个零售商组成的供应链激励机制模型,接着分析引入自有品牌的供应链激励机制均衡结果,最后对自有品牌引入前后的均衡结果进行比较。通过分析发现,零售商在制造商品牌上的努力水平始终不超过其在自有品牌上的努力水平;在对称信息下,零售商引入自有品牌肯定会使制造商受到损失,而在非对称信息下制造商可能会从中获利。The paper establishes an incentive model for the supply chain that comprises of two manufacturers and one retailer with symmetric and asymmetric information respectively and analyzes the effect on the introduction of private brand on the performance of the incentive mechanism in each instance.It is found that the effort level of the retailer is always higher with private brand than with manufacturer brand;with symmetric information,there is a sure loss for the manufacturers after the introduction of private brand and with asymmetric information,they maybe benefited by the addition.

关 键 词：供应链 激励机制 自有品牌 非对称信息 努力水平 风险规避 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理] F243.5[经济管理—国民经济]