基于经理人过度投资行为的控制权配置机制设计  

On the Mechanism Design of the Control Rights Allocation under Managers' Over-Investment Behaviors

作　　者：张红波[1] 王国顺[2] 

机构地区：[1]湖南科技大学工业工程系,湖南湘潭411201 [2]北京工商大学科技处,北京100048

出　　处：《当代经济科学》2011年第5期78-84,127,共7页Modern Economic Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(编号:70772040);湖南省哲学社会科学基金项目(编号:09YBB148);湖南科技大学科学研究基金(编号:E58115)

摘　　要：通过建立一个基本分析框架,研究了经理人过度投资行为与控制权配置机制设计之间的关系,研究结果表明,设计适当的控制权配置机制能够有效缓解经理人的过度投资行为,且控制权的配置存在着某些规律性,并由此得到了一些重要结论:当市场机制较为完善或股东的监督效力比较强时,或当投资项目的风险较大而使监督经营行为的成本很大时,经理人应配置更大的控制权;当经理人获取隐性收益的能力和可能性较大时,经理人应配置较小的控制权;配置给经理人的最优控制权及其最优分成比例在激励功能上是互补的,为降低经理人的过度投资而设计的激励机制就是在两者之间进行权衡。文章最后还对缓解我国公司经理人的过度投资行为提出了建议。This paper studied the relationship between managers＇ over-investment behaviors and the mech- anism design of the control rights allocation by developing a basic analysis frame. The results indicate that de- signing the proper mechanism of the control rights allocation can restrain managers＇ over-investment behaviors and the control rights allocation has certain regularities. We thus conclude that managers should allocate more control rights as the market mechanism is more perfect or shareholders＇ monitor is quite strong, or as the moni- toring cost to the management caused by investment risks is tremendous; that managers should allocate fewer control rights as managers＇ ability and possibility to gain the hidden income is big; that the optimal control rights and the optimal sharecropping rate to managers are supplementary in the incentive function, the incentive mechanism to restrain managers＇ over-investment is the tradeoff between these two aspects.

关 键 词：过度投资 控制权私人收益 控制权配置 激励机制 ’ 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]