员工甄别和筛选:基于动机公平偏好隐藏的激励契约研究  

Employee Screening and Selection: Incentive Contract Research Based on Rabin Fairness Function under the Condition that Preference is Hidden

作　　者：吴国东[1,2] 蒲勇健[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400044 [2]重庆师范大学经济与管理学院,重庆400047

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2011年第3期78-84,共7页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家社会科学基金资助项目(07BJY017)

摘　　要：作为代理人的员工在纯粹自利偏好之外,往往还有追求动机公平的偏好,不过现实中员工的公平偏好往往是隐藏的,是其私人信息。作为委托人的企业如果要雇佣所有类型的员工,设计契约来甄别不同类型的员工是不可能的,这样员工往往可以获取信息租金。企业如果仅仅雇佣某一类型的员工,则可以通过参与约束条件实现对员工的甄别与筛选,从而完全抽取员工的信息租金,提高企业的期望利润。The classical contract theory assumes that game players are only concerned with personal interests.However,many experiments indicate that game players also have fairness preferences.Recent behavior contract studies incorporate fairness preference into the classical contract theory.Two kinds of utility function theories describing fairness preference are available.The first is the inequality-aversion theory,such as Fehr and Schmidt utility function,that emphasizes equitable distribution of material gains.The second is the reciprocity theory,such as Rabin utility function,that thinks highly of behavior motivation,and emphasizes returning a favor with a favor.The first theory has been widely used because its application is simple.The second theory is based on the psychological game theory,and more difficult in its applications.This paper adopts Rabin function to study optimum incentive contract on the assumption that an agent＇s fairness preference is hidden. Firstly symmetrical information is studied as a benchmark.Under the circumstances of symmetrical information,an agent＇s fairness preference is a common knowledge under the condition of symmetrical information.The principle can design the optimum contract according to an agent＇s preference because the optimum contract is type dependent. Under the circumstance of asymmetric information,an agent＇s preference is hidden under the condition of asymmetric information.The principle cannot observe an agent＇s preference directly.The principle can only discriminate an agent＇s preference by designing incentive compatible mechanisms.If two types of agents are employed,the optimum contract becomes complicated because it needs to satisfy both incentive compatibility constraint and individual rationality constraint.Therefore,it is impossible to discriminate different agents by designing a contract menu that rewards different agents with different salaries.The conclusion is similar to the findings of Siemens＇ study（2005）.Although the conclusion is the same,the

关 键 词：Rabin公平效用函数 逆向选择模型 信息租金 雇佣 

分 类 号：F270.5[经济管理—企业管理]