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作 者:龙跃[1,2]
机构地区:[1]重庆工商大学商务策划学院,重庆400067 [2]电子商务及供应链系统重庆市市级重点实验室,重庆400067
出 处:《情报杂志》2011年第10期123-127,共5页Journal of Intelligence
基 金:重庆工商大学科研启动经费项目"现代服务环境下制造服务合作创新机理及模式研究"(编号:1155003)研究成果之一
摘 要:针对竞争性联盟中知识共享与利益分配的矛盾,以2家同质企业组成的竞争性联盟为研究对象,建立了基于Cournot模型拓展后的企业利润均衡模型和考虑贡献程度修正的Shapley分配模型,利用利润均衡模型对两企业在不同决策下的知识共享博弈过程进行了分析,利用分配模型对联盟成员的利润分配进行协调,以调整成员决策行为,并结合示例进行了验证。结果表明:竞争性联盟成员在进行知识共享时,在引入联盟分配权的机制下进行收益协调,有利于缓解竞争性联盟中知识共享与利益分配的矛盾,促进各企业共同优化价值链,提高资源利用率,降低单位成本、增加利润。To discuss the contradiction of knowledge-sharing and interests coordination in competitive alliance, the alliance including two homogeneous enterprises were taken as the research object. Profit equilibrium model based on expanded Coumot competition model and the Shapley distribution model modified with contribution factors were set up. Profit equilibrium model was used to explain the process of knowledge-sharing game in the enterprises under different decisions. The expanded Shapley distribution model was used to discuss how the profit could be allocated appropriately to adjust decision-making behavior among the members. Finally, an example was given to testify the model. The results showed that, with knowledge-sharing in competitive alliance, and coordination of profits by establishing distribution mechanism importing union distribution power, the contradiction of knowledge-sharing and interests coordination is corupetitiveance can be relieved; each member's value chain can be enhanced; the cost can be reduced and profit can be increased
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