民营企业绩效考核中的博弈行为分析  

The Game Behavior Analysis in Private Enterprises Performance Appraisal

作　　者：王晓晖[1] 刘帅[1] 

机构地区：[1]安徽大学商学院,合肥230039

出　　处：《科技和产业》2011年第10期55-57,共3页Science Technology and Industry

基　　金：安徽省哲学社会科学规划项目(AHSKF09-10D13)成果之一

摘　　要：在民营企业中,绩效考核者主要是指用人部门主管,被考核者则是指员工,本文假设绩效考核双方在绩效评价过程中为追求个人利益最大化存在着利己行为倾向,这种行为会对组织利益产生不利影响。通过分析验证企业惩罚机制在绩效考核双方的博弈过程的作用,得出民营企业应该建立惩罚监督机制的结论。In private enterprise,the performance appraisal were mainly refers to the employing department heads,who have been assessing refers to employees,this article assumes that the two sides in the performance evaluation of the performance appraisal process for the pursuit of personal interests tend to maximize the existence of self-serving behavior,such behavior would adversely affect the interests of the organization.Verified through the analysis of corporate punishment mechanism in the process of performance appraisal of both the role of the game,come to punish private companies should establish monitoring mechanisms conclusions.

关 键 词：绩效考核 博弈 惩罚机制 

分 类 号：F272.3[经济管理—企业管理]