内部控制、产权与高管薪酬业绩敏感性  

Internal Control,Property Right and Executive Pay-performance Sensitivity

作　　者：卢锐[1,2] 柳建华 许宁[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]中山大学岭南学院,510275 [2]华林证券有限责任公司,518048

出　　处：《会计研究》2011年第10期42-48,共7页Accounting Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70802062,70902023,71032006);广东省自然科学基金博士启动项目(9451027501002449)的阶段性成果;财政部全国会计领军(后备)人才项目的支持;中山大学岭南学院经济研究所的资助

摘　　要：内部控制的实施约束了经理人的自利行为,从而有助于提升公司的业绩,那么理性的经理人必然会要求将其薪酬与公司的业绩挂钩,从而实现自身报酬的弥补。鉴于此,本文实证检验了内部控制质量与高管薪酬业绩敏感性之间的关系。结果发现:内部控制质量越高的公司,其管理层薪酬业绩的敏感度也越高,而且,相对于非国有控股的上市公司,国有控股上市公司的内部控制质量和薪酬业绩敏感度之间的协同性更加显著。进一步研究显示,随着时间的推进,上市公司内部控制质量与高管的薪酬业绩敏感性关系更为密切,说明内控的质量在不断提高。The enforcement of internal control can restrict the self-interest behavior of manager and thereby improve corporate performance. Therefore rational managers will require to link their pay with corporate performance as a compensation. Based on these,this paper empirically examine the relationship between internal control quality and executive pay-performance sensitivity. The results show that the listed companies with the high internal control quality usually have high executive pay-performance sensitivity. Moreover,as opposed to non-state–controlled listed companies,the coherence between internal control quality and executive pay-performance sensitivity in state-controlled listed companies is more significant. Further research find that the coherence relationship in Chinese listed companies is increasing as the year goes which indicate the internal control quality is improving.

关 键 词：内部控制 产权 薪酬业绩敏感性 协同性 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理] F272.92[经济管理—国民经济] F271F224