两类公允价值变动对高管薪酬的差异影响研究——基于我国A股上市公司2007-2008数据检验  

A Study on the Different Effects of Two Types of the Changes in Fair Value on Executive's Compensations:Empirical Evidence from Chinese A-Share Listed Firms in 2007-2008

作　　者：张金若[1,2] 张飞达[1,2] 邹海峰[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,400044 [2]中山大学管理学院,510275

出　　处：《会计研究》2011年第10期63-68,97,共6页Accounting Research

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究西部和边疆地区项目(11XJC790015);中央高校基本科研业务费(CDJSK100065和CDJSK11069)的阶段性研究成果

摘　　要：本文以A股上市公司2007-2008年数据检验两类公允价值变动对高管薪酬的差异影响。研究发现:(1)计入利润表的公允价值变动利得(损失)与高管薪酬变动显著正相关(不相关),存在"重奖轻罚"现象;(2)直接计入资本公积的公允价值变动也对高管薪酬的变动产生影响,同样存在"重奖轻罚";(3)计入利润表的公允价值变动对高管薪酬变动的影响显著大于计入资本公积的公允价值变动。研究结果表明:高管薪酬契约未能恰当利用公允价值变动信息,均源于金融资产但列报不同的两类公允价值,对高管薪酬具有差异影响。该结论支持了高管可能基于薪酬原因操纵金融资产分类的观点,并为我国2009年利润表朝向综合收益的改革提供了一些经验支持。Using the manually-collected data from Chinese A-share listed firms in 2007-2008,this paper investigates the different effects of two methods of recognizing the changes in fair values into the financial statements on the executive compensation. The empirical results show that the executive compensation is significantly affected by the changes in the fair value recognized into the income statement,regardless of gains or losses. However,the changes in fair value recognized into Additional Paid-In Capital have relatively weaker impact and the compensation contracts attach less importance to losses than gains. Our study has the following implications. Executive compensation contracts might not use the information of the changes in the fair value properly,that is,different ways of presentation of the essentially same information,which both come from financial assets,affect the executive compensation differently. The results support the argument that managers may manipulate the classification of financial assets to get higher compensations. Most importantly,this study provides some evidence for the reform of income statements towards Comprehensive income in 2009.

关 键 词：高管薪酬 公允价值变动 列报 综合收益 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理] F272.92[经济管理—国民经济] F224