当期产出、转移支付与继任博弈  

Current Output,Transfers and the Game of Succession

作　　者：梁松[1] 刁莉[2] 

机构地区：[1]中南财经政法大学经济学院 [2]武汉大学经济与管理学院

出　　处：《经济评论》2011年第6期21-31,共11页Economic Review

基　　金：武汉大学70后团队"中国服务贸易国际竞争力研究"的阶段性研究成果;"中央高校基本科研业务专项资金"一般项目资助

摘　　要：各种组织都存在职位的继任。在任者需要决定当期产出以及留给继任者的转移支付。通过博弈分析可以发现,存在转移支付占个人总贡献的比例为常数的均衡策略,但要同时满足组织总产出最大化目标的难度较大。当参与人只参与一次博弈,则不同类型的参与人策略选择不同,博弈的解是贝叶斯均衡。当某些参数因人而异时,每个参与人的转移支付比例也不一样。如果在任者对于未来贡献的效用评价很低或者无法获得相应的回报时,将出现短视行为、"政绩工程"和组织中的利他行动提供不足。而在家族式组织的继任中,参与人效用函数受家族关系的影响并且对于继任者人选的限制使得个人和组织最优化目标的偏离扩大。There exists position succession in any kind of organization. The incumbent one needs to decide the level of current output and transfer to her successor. We can notice that there will be an equilibrium strategy with constant proportion of the transfers to the total personal contribution by game theory analyzing. But it is difficult to satisfy the condition of maximizing the total output of the organization at the same time. If the payers can only play one time, different types of payers will make different choice. And the equilibrium is Bayesian. When some parameters vary with different players, the proportion of transfers will vary with different players. If the incumbent one has very low utility level for leaving contribution to the future or with no repay for the transfers, there will be shortsighted activities,＂vanity projects＂ and lack of altruism. In the family organization the utility function of players is influenced by genetic relationship. The candidates are limited. This increases the divergence between personal and organizational optimal objectives.

关 键 词：产出 转移支付 继任 均衡策略 

分 类 号：F272.92[经济管理—企业管理] F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]