论道德之“见”的认识困境——也谈《孟子》“见牛未见羊”  

The Epistemological Dilemma of Seeing in Morality——an Analysis of the "Seeing the Ox,not the Sheep" in Mencius

作　　者：何丽艳[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国人民武装警察部队学院,河北廊坊065000

出　　处：《学术探索》2012年第1期18-21,共4页Academic Exploration

摘　　要：近年来,学界对《孟子》齐宣王"见牛未见羊"现象多有阐发,由此引发了人们对儒家道德之"见"的广泛关注。其实,《孟子》论"见牛未见羊",阐述了因"见牛觳觫"而产生"德性之知"的德性主义认识路线。在这条认识路线中,"见"不仅可以使见者体认本心良知,也使某些无良被见者有了欺骗君子"以方"的可乘之机。"见"在促成德性之知的过程中积极有为,但也隐藏着诚与欺的认识困境。无疑,摆脱这种道德认识困境对当前中国道德文明建设是具有一定积极意义的。In recent years, many scholars have been discussing the phenomenon of ＂seeing the ox, not seeing the sheep＂ in Mencius, which has the function of ＂seeing＂ deeply concerned at large. Essentially, Mencius discussed ＂seeing the ox, not seeing the sheep＂ for the purpose of explaining his moralistic line of cognition, namely, having the ＂knowledge of morality＂ when ＂seeing the ox trembling from fear. ＂ In fact, ＂seeing＂ can not only cause us to examine our original mind, but also can become the precondition for ＂men of honor being deceived logically＂. Therefore, playing an indispensable role in the ＂knowledge of mo- rality＂, ＂seeing＂ hides an epistemological dilemma of trust and deception for a gentleman. There＇ s no doubt that removal of the dilemma is of great significance in terms of moral civilization.

关 键 词：见 诚 欺 德性之知 

分 类 号：G410[文化科学—教育学]