基于公平心理偏好的投资博弈——敲竹杠问题的一个行为解决  

The Investment Game Based on Equity Preference: A Behavioral Solution to Hold-up Problem

作　　者：李晓颖[1] 张凤林[2] 

机构地区：[1]中共大连市委党校经济学教研室,邮政编码116013 [2]东北财经大学经济学院,邮政编码116025

出　　处：《经济评论》2012年第1期25-31,共7页Economic Review

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究项目"基于空间统计和空间计量技术的区域人类发展模型:中国的市政"(项目编号:10YJC790131);大连市社会科学院项目"大连市专业技术人才发展的激励机制研究"(项目编号:2011DLSK209)的资助

摘　　要：敲竹杠问题是不完全合约理论的中心话题,经典文献认为,如果合约是不完全的,当事人的专用性投资会引发敲竹杠风险从而导致无效率的专用性投资。但是,关于敲竹杠问题的文献通常假定事后谈判结果对事前投资成本不敏感。通过在雇佣双方的投资博弈中引入投资成本相关性这种合作的谈判方式,将传统敲竹杠模型中影响谈判力的因素与当事人对公平偏好的行为因素二者融合,本文证明:与传统的投资博弈相比,在投资成本影响企业(雇员)谈判力的情况下,双方有更强的专用性人力资本投资激励。雇佣双方所面临的敲竹杠风险取决于双方的初始谈判力,且双方有可能在事前做出社会最优甚至过度的投资。这也从一个方面解释了现实中大量存在的有效投资现象。Hold- up problem is a central topic of incomplete contract theory. The classical literatures argue that if the contract is incomplete,the agents ＇ specific investment will bring on hold - up risk, so as to induce inefficient specific investment. But the literatures with regard to hold - up problem usually assume that the outcome of bargaining is insensitive to investment cost. By introducing the bargaining mode of the relevance of investment cost into investment game, and combining the factors that affect the bargaining power in traditional model and the behavioral factor of agents＇ equity preference, this paper proves that compared with traditional investment game ,in the case that investment cost influences bargaining power, both sides have more investment incentives. The hold - up risk faced by employer and employee depends on the initial bargaining power of both sides ,and both sides may even make investment over social optimal.

关 键 词：专用性人力资本 敲竹杠 公平偏好 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理] F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]