政府控制与企业高管人员薪酬绩效敏感度  

Government Control and Pay Performance Sensitivity of Firm Top Managers

作　　者：赵卫斌[1] 陈志斌[2] 

机构地区：[1]南京大学商学院 [2]东南大学经济管理学院

出　　处：《管理学报》2012年第2期267-271,共5页Chinese Journal of Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71172064;70972039);教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划资助项目(NCET-10-0452);教育部人文社会科学研究资助项目(08JA630036)

摘　　要：根据我国新的国有资产管理体制特征,着眼于我国政府对国有企业实行分级管理的背景,将国有上市公司分为中央政府控股的上市公司和地方政府控股的上市公司2类。由于政府对这2类公司监管程度的差异、企业面对的市场风险的不同,以及这2类公司高管人员对薪酬的关注程度存在差异,说明薪酬在这2类国有上市公司中的重要性并不一致。研究结果表明,国有上市公司高管人员薪酬的业绩敏感性与政府控制人的行政级别相关,中央政府控制企业的高管人员的薪酬业绩敏感性更低。This paper catalog the state-owned enterprise to two kinds of corporation, corporation controlled by the central government and controlled by local government according to the new state owned enterprise management system and the institutional background that different level government control different state-owned enterprise. Since the supervision of central and local government varies, the market risk of these two kinds of firms facing differ, and the concerns of pay for top managers in these two kinds of firms are not similar and pay plays different role for these firms. This paper found that pay performance sensitivity is lower for firms controlled by central government compared with those controlled by local government.

关 键 词：实际控制人 薪酬 薪酬业绩敏感性 

分 类 号：C93[经济管理—管理学]