基于信号传递博弈模型的我国食品安全问题探析  

Probing into China food safety problem basing on signal transmission game moDe

作　　者：刘俊威[1] 

机构地区：[1]湖州师范学院商学院

出　　处：《特区经济》2012年第1期303-304,共2页Special Zone Economy

摘　　要：本文运用信号传递博弈模型的原理来分析我国食品安全问题。认为:我国食品安全形势之所以异常严峻,关键原因是食品监管机构的打击行动属于高成本类型,由此决定了监管机构对食品违法犯罪行为的一次次默许或疏于打击,导致不法食品企业不断修正被打击的后验概率大小,预期利润的净现值不断加大,强烈刺激着不法企业的违法犯罪动机;文章最后分析了我国食品监管机构的打击行动属高成本类型的具体原因,并给出简要的对策建议。This paper analyzes the China＇s food safety problems by principle of signaling game model.Study concluded that： The reason why China＇s food security situation is extremely severe,the key reason is the regulatory body＇s action are high-cost type,which determines the regulators crack down again and again neglect,criminal enterprises conclude posterior probability of being hit constantly decreaing,the net present value of anticipated profits increasing,stimulating strongly illegal motive for the crime of the criminal enterprise;At last,the article analyzes the cost of China＇s food regulatory body type of the specific reasons and gives a brief response.

关 键 词：食品安全 信号传递博弈 后验概率 成本类型 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济] F203