刑事证人作证的经济分析  

An Economic Analysis of Criminal Witnesses

作　　者：刘廷华[1] 

机构地区：[1]宜宾学院政府管理学院,四川宜宾644000

出　　处：《广东商学院学报》2012年第2期80-87,共8页Journal of Guangdong University of Business Studies

摘　　要：若刑事证人出庭作证的私人收益小于社会收益,则拒绝作证是理性选择的结果。对于偶然证人而言,由社会承担作证成本是激励其作证的基本前提;更有效的激励措施是对其作证行为进行奖励,刑事悬赏制度的成功便是例证。对于作为消极证人的近亲属而言,无论是对其作证行为进行奖励还是对其拒证行为进行惩罚,效果都是不理想的,允许亲亲相隐是更合理的制度选择。对于污点证人而言,仅仅豁免其罪刑,或者实施保护是远远不够的,更重要的是加大打击有组织犯罪的力度,缩短犯罪组织的生命周期。The personal income of a criminal witness is less than the social benefit, so refusing to testify is the result of rational choice. The society＇ s bearing of testifying costs is the basic premise to encourage an ac- cidental witness to appear in court as a witness; and more effective incentives are to reward the testifying conduct exemplified by the success of criminal reward system. As for a negative witness＇ s close relatives, the effect of either rewarding the testifying conduct or punishing the act of refusing to testify is not ideal, so permitting the mutual concealment of offenses among the kin is a more reasonable choice of system. As far as a stain witness is concerned, only the exemption from the crime or the implementation of protection is not e- nough, so what is more important is to strengthen the fighting against organized crimes and to shorten the life cycle of criminal organization.

关 键 词：刑事证人 刑事悬赏 偶然证人 亲亲相隐 污点证人 

分 类 号：D925.2[政治法律—诉讼法学]