创新型企业公司治理结构与绩效关系研究--基于中国创业板上市公司的经验证据  

Research of Relationship Between Corporate Governance Structure and Performance in Innovative Enterprises——Based on Empirical Evidence of Companies Listed on China's GEM

作　　者：周建[1,2] 王鹏飞[1,2] 李文佳[2] 陈素蓉[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]南开大学公司治理研究中心 [2]南开大学商学院

出　　处：《经济与管理研究》2012年第4期106-115,共10页Research on Economics and Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目“中国企业国际化进程中制度转型、战略选择与竞争优势源泉研究”(70872048);教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划项目“国际化战略背景下中国国有企业公司治理评价与竞争优势研究”(NCET-08-0302);教育部人文社科重点研究基地重大项目“基于董事会能力的企业投融资战略治理研究”(11JJD630005);南开大学“985工程”中国企业管理与制度创新基地资助项目(1050821210)

摘　　要：本文选取2009～2010年在创业板上市的51家公司作为样本实证研究了创新型企业公司治理结构对公司绩效的影响。研究发现,中国创新型企业存在着实际控制人权力过大的问题,其治理结构表现出较明显的内部人控制现象,而独立董事的引入在一定程度上缓解了这一问题,并在公司绩效中得以体现。高管薪酬与公司绩效正相关,较高的薪酬水平能够有效激励高管团队创造良好的业绩。由于风险投资机构追求短期收益以及成为公司股东的时间较短,风险投资的引入并没有为创新型企业带来更高绩效。Based on the sample of 51 GEM -listed companies of the year 2009 -2010, the impact of corporate governance structure of innovative enterprises on their performance is explored in the paper. As can be seen through the empirical analysis, there is a problem in China＇s innovative enterprise that actual controller has excessive power, and the introduction of independent directors alleviates this problem to some extent, which is reflected in company performance. We also find that executive compensation is positively related with corporate performance, which explains that the high level of salary incentive contributes to a good performance. The introduction of venture capitals does not result in higher performance for the innovative enterprises, which is related with the institutions＇ pursuit of short - term gains and the short term of their becoming the company＇s shareholders.

关 键 词：创新型企业 股权结构 董事会 高管团队 风险投资 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理]