机构投资者与董事会之间交互治理效应的实证研究  

An Empirical Analysis of Interactive Governance Effects between Institutional Investors and Board of Directors

作　　者：吕钦[1] 刘红娟[2] 

机构地区：[1]广东科学技术职业学院广州学院,广东广州510640 [2]广东外语外贸大学经贸学院,广东广州510006

出　　处：《广西财经学院学报》2012年第2期95-100,共6页Journal of Guangxi University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学青年项目(11YJC790103)

摘　　要：本文利用机构相对长时间持股的上市公司为样本,考察了专业机构投资者和董事会这两种重要内外部治理机制在改善公司治理方面的交互效应。董事会的公司治理指标选择了独立董事比例和董事会的领导权结构。模型采用动态矩方法进行估计,结果表明:机构投资者和独立董事没有独立促进公司治理,但却通过交互影响来间接发挥了改善公司治理的作用;董事会领导权结构既没有表现出独立的治理作用,也没体现出交互效应。本文的研究结论为客观合理看待专业机构投资者和独立董事的治理价值提供了视角。This study takes listed companies where there are long-time institational sharehdders as samples,analyzes the interactive effects between the professional institutional investors and the Board of Directors—two important internal and external governance mechanisms for corporate governance.The proportion of independent directors and the leadership structure of Board of Directors are selected as the indicators for the corporate governance of Board of Directors.The models are estimated with the dynamic moment estimation method.The study shows that institutional investors and independent directors play positive roles to improve indirectly corporate governance through their interactive influences,though they do not promote directly the corporate governance.And the leadership structure of Board of Directors neither plays independent governance roles nor has interactive effects in corporate governance.The research conclusions of this article provide objective and rational perspectives to review the governance value of professional institutional investors and independent directors.

关 键 词：机构投资者 独立董事比例 领导权结构 交互治理效应 

分 类 号：F271.5[经济管理—企业管理]