政府控制、管理层代理动机与国企治理  

Government Control,Management Agent Motivation and State-owned Enterprise's Corporate Governance

作　　者：高文亮[1] 程培先[1] 

机构地区：[1]河北金融学院会计系,河北保定071051

出　　处：《山西财经大学学报》2012年第6期86-95,共10页Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家社科基金"我国垄断企业高管薪酬机制研究"(10XJL012);河北金融学院博士科研基金"河北省上市公司薪酬激励现状研究"(JY201201);河北省社科基金"政府控制;管理层权力与国企高管薪酬合理"(HB12GL075)

摘　　要：结合政府对国有企业薪酬控制的制度背景,本文就政府控制对国企管理层代理动机的影响进行了理论分析和实证检验。研究发现,政府对薪酬的控制加大了国有企业的代理成本,国企垄断属性加重了此影响。同时,研究结果还显示,管理层权力越大,代理成本越高。相应的治理对策是:从公司治理入手,提高高管薪酬契约的有效性;在垄断行业引入竞争机制,降低垄断属性的负面影响;提高董事会的独立性,约束管理层权力,降低管理层寻租能力。Based on the institutional settings of executive compensation regulation （ECR） of Chinese state-owned enterprises （SOEs）, this paper analyzes the impact of government control on the management agent motivation in SOEs. Using the data on stated- owned listed firms, this paper finds that the government control increase the agency cost of SOEs, state-owned monopoly can make this effect more serious. At the same time, the results show that managerial power is bigger, and agency cost is higher. SOEs shall use corporate governance to improve the efficiency of executive compensation contract, introduce competitive mechanism in monopoly in- dustry, reduce the negative effects of monopoly. The independence of the board of directors should be enhanced.

关 键 词：国有企业 薪酬管制 代理成本 垄断企业 

分 类 号：F271.5[经济管理—企业管理]