刑事悬赏的法经济学分析  

Law and Economics Analysis for Criminal Reward

作　　者：刘廷华[1] 

机构地区：[1]宜宾学院,四川宜宾644000

出　　处：《公安理论与实践（上海公安高等专科学校学报）》2012年第3期76-79,共4页Journal of Shanghai Police College

摘　　要：在没有悬赏情况下,由于刑事举报的私人收益小于社会收益,刑事举报的数量会低于社会有效率的水平。依据谈判理论,按照一定比例分割合作剩余是实现合作的前提。在义务举报制度下公安机关完全垄断了合作剩余,降低了知情人的合作意愿。与此不同,刑事悬赏能为举报人提供适当激励,有利于解决刑事举报不足的问题。为了保证刑事悬赏制度有效运行,必须保证举报人得到赏金并免受打击报复。Because of private revenue less than social benefits, the number of criminal accusation will be lower than the social efficiency level in the absence of criminal reward cases. The theory of negotiation points out that to distribute cooperation surplus is precondition of realizing cooperation according to a certain proportion. Public security organs complete monopoly the surplus of cooperation and reduce the person＇s willingness to cooperate under the compulsory reporting system. Criminal reward can provide appropriate incentives for informants and helps to solve the problem of insufficient criminal accusation. In order to ensure the effective operation of the criminal reward system, we must ensure the informants were bounty and avoid revenge.

关 键 词：刑事悬赏 谈判 合作剩余 激励 保护 

分 类 号：D915[政治法律—诉讼法学]