资产专用性视角下的纵向一体化与企业政治行为  

Vertical Integration and Corporate Political Activity Based on the View of Asset Specificity

作　　者：曾楚宏[1] 朱仁宏[2] 

机构地区：[1]广东外语外贸大学粤商研究中心 [2]中山大学管理学院

出　　处：《财经科学》2012年第7期60-68,共9页Finance & Economics

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究青年项目(编号:09YJC630041);广东省软科学研究项目(编号:2011A070200012);广州市哲学社会科学研究项目(编号:11Q22)

摘　　要：资产专用性情况下的企业治理机制选择问题,与我们探讨的交易费用理论的传统观点有所不同,我们认为除了纵向一体化机制可以解决因资产专用性所带来的"敲竹杠"问题之外,企业政治行为也同样可以实现这一目标。而且与纵向一体化是一种以效率为导向的事后治理机制有所不同,企业政治行为是一种以战略为导向的事前治理机制,两者是可以相互替代的,权衡的标准取决于两者的成本比较。进一步地,我们考察了不同情境下两者的替代情况。The paper disusses the choice of mechanism of firm＇s governance under the condition of specific asset. Compared to the traditional viewpoint of transactional cost theory, we consider corporate pelitical ac-tivity can resolve the ＂ holdup＂ question result from the asset specificity as well as vertical integration. Ver-tical integration is an ex post mechanism of governance and its aim is eiticiency, while corporate political ac- tivity is an ex ante mechanism of governance and its aim is strategy. All of them carl be substituted by each other, which lies on the costs relatively. Furthermore, we study the substitution under different conditions.

关 键 词：资产专用性 纵向一体化 企业政治行为 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]