动态多任务双边道德风险契约研究  

Study on Multi-Task Dynamic Incentive Contract Design Based on Double Moral Hazard Prevention

作　　者：温新刚[1] 刘新民[2] 丁黎黎[2] 秦岚[1] 

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学管理学院,陕西西安710049 [2]山东科技大学经济管理学院,山东青岛266510

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2012年第3期212-219,共8页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70971078);(71001057);教育部人文社科规划一般项目(09YJA630089);山东省博士基金项目(2010BSE06034)

摘　　要：针对管理活动的动态性与多任务性的特点,将解聘补偿与解聘倾向引入动态多任务契约设计中,构建了基于解聘补偿的动态多任务双边道德风险契约。通过数理推导分析的方法给出了最优契约设计,声誉效应和棘轮效应的度量,探讨了解聘倾向对于契约设计的影响。结果表明解聘倾向的引入对于委托人的道德风险约束是有效的,但是对于代理人的道德风险约束则取决于声誉效应与棘轮效应的大小。在第2期契约中,解聘倾向对固定支付的影响取决于代理人保留收入与解聘补偿的差额。而第1期的契约设计要受到解聘补偿,声誉效应与棘轮效应三者的综合影响。任务关联性对契约设计影响以及相应的实证分析是未来的研究方向。Based on the managerial characteristics of multi-task and dynamic, this paper introduces dismissal compensation and tendency into the design of incentive contract, and builds a double moral hazard prevention mechanism. Through the mathematical induction methodr this paper gives optimal contract design, measures reputation and ratchet effect, and discusses the effect of dismissal tendency on incentive design. The results show that dismissal tendency can effectively prevent the principal＇s moral hazard, while the prevention on the agent＇s side is determined by the strength of reputation and ratchet effect. In the second period contract, the difference between agent＇ s retained income and dismissal compensation determines the effect of dismissal tendency on the fixed income. In the first period, the agent＇ s optimal efforts and incentive coefficient can be affected by the compensation, reputation effect and ratchet effect. How the relationship among different tasks affects the contract design can be further studied.

关 键 词：企业管理 契约设计 委托代理模型 双边道德风险 动态 多任务 解聘补偿 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理]