横向监督中基于社会偏好匹配的员工组合问题研究  

The Study on Employee Combination within Horizontal Monitoring Based on Social Preference Matching

作　　者：王艳梅[1] 赵希男[1] 

机构地区：[1]东北大学工商管理学院,辽宁沈阳110004

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2012年第3期227-235,共9页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：教育部博士点新教师基金资助项目(200801451043);中国博士后科学基金面上资助项目(20100481194);中央高校基本科研业务费资助项目(N100406009)

摘　　要：考虑横向监督中基于社会偏好的三种员工组合方式:同质组合、异质组合与双高组合。运用委托代理理论,研究基于社会偏好匹配的员工组合问题。模型分别给出了不存在横向监督、存在横向监督且员工是同质组合、存在横向监督且员工是异质组合与存在横向监督且员工是双高组合四种情形下的均衡结果。根据均衡结果做进一步分析,得出结论:①存在横向监督时员工的努力程度与企业收益总是高于不存在横向监督的情形,但不同的员工组合方式对其努力程度的激励效果是相同的;②异质组合能够通过节约薪酬成本而间接地提高企业总收益,双高组合能够通过获得较多的员工投入而直接增加企业总收益,并且异质组合与双高组合总是优于同质组合;③员工的社会偏好与风险成本是决定企业最佳员工组合方式选择的关键因素:当员工的风险成本很小而社会偏好差距较大时企业应选择异质组合;而当员工的风险成本很大或者风险成本小并且员工社会偏好差距也较小时企业应选择双高组合;因此,根据员工的个性特征选择适宜的组合方式是实现横向监督激励效应最大化的关键。There are three kinds of employee combination when horizontal monitoring exists in a corporation： grouping employees of different social preference, grouping workers of high social preference and grouping workers of similar social preference. These will be defined respectively as a homogeneous combination, heterogeneous combination and double-high combination. Based on principal-agent theory, the optimal combination considering employee＇ social preference information is studied. The model presents the equilibrium outcomes under different conditions. According to the equilibrium outcomes, some conclusions are founded： 1, When horizontal monitoring exists, the employee＇ efforts and corporation＇ s income are always higher than those without horizontal monitoring. But different combinations have a the same effects on the employee＇ efforts; 2, Heterogeneous combination can increase corporation total benefits through caving salaries for employees indirectly, but the double-high combination can increase corporation total benefits directly through obtaining more efforts from employees, and heterogeneous combination and double-high combination are always better than homogeneous mix. 3, employee＇ social preference and the risk-costs are key factors of selecting combination way： The corporation should choose heterogeneous combination when risk-costs are very small and preference＇ s gap between employees is greater; the corporation should choose the double-high combination when risk-costs are very great or when risk-costs are very small and preference＇ s gap between employees is smaller. So to maximize the incentive effects of the horizontal monitoring, the corporation should choose an appropriate combination way according to the employee＇ personality.

关 键 词：横向监督 道德风险 员工组合 激励效应 

分 类 号：F272.92[经济管理—企业管理]