管理层权力理论研究最新进展  

Research Development in Managerial Power Approach

作　　者：高文亮[1] 陈镜宇[1] 

机构地区：[1]河北金融学院,河北保定071051

出　　处：《财会通讯（下）》2012年第7期101-104,129,共4页Communication of Finance and Accounting

基　　金：国家社科基金"我国垄断企业高管薪酬机制研究"(项目编号:10XJL012);河北社科基金"政府控制;管理层权力与国企商管薪酬治理"(项目编号:HB1ZGL075);河南金融学院博士科研基金"河北省上市公司薪酬激励现状研究"(项目编号:JY201201)的阶段性成果

摘　　要：国外管理层权力理论成为解释薪酬现象的重要基础理论,但国内对其研究并不多见。管理层权力论在在委托代理理论和信息不对称理论的基础上发展起来,对最优契约理论难以解释的现象给出了合理解释。众多国内外研究给出了支持管理层权力理论的经验证据,研究结果"愤怒"是抑制高管薪酬的重要工具。国内监管方应该提高股东话语权,为股东表达"愤怒"提供场所,加强信息披露,让股东有"愤怒"的来源。政府作为投资者应该在合适时机表达自身"愤怒",提高公司薪酬管理水平。本文对此进行了综述。The managerial power approach has become an important basis to explain the phenomenon of executive compensation. The power of management is based on the agency theory and asymmetric information. Many international experts presented experience evidence that the managerial power approach is right. According to the results of the theoretical study of power management, 'outrage' is an important tool for inhibition of executive pay. National regulators should enhance shareholder’s power; provide the place to expressed 'outrage'; strengthen information disclosure. The Government should expressed their 'outrage' and raise the level of remuneration management.

关 键 词：高管薪酬 管理层权力 委托代理理论 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]