存在自营店的供应链薪酬激励机制研究  

Study on Remuneration and Incentive Mechanism for Supply Chains with Self-operated Stores

作　　者：谢会芹[1] 杨明明[1] 郭永元 

机构地区：[1]河北科技师范学院工商管理学院,河北秦皇岛066004 [2]河北海事局巡查执法支队,河北秦皇岛066004

出　　处：《物流技术》2012年第7期342-346,共5页Logistics Technology

基　　金：四川省科技支撑计划项目(2011SZ0228);2012年秦皇岛市重点应用性研究课题(201206105)

摘　　要：针对存在自营店的供应链薪酬激励机制设计问题,首先在对称信息和非对称信息下建立了由制造商、零售商及自营店组成的供应链薪酬激励机制模型,然后分析存在自营店的薪酬激励机制设计结果及其信息价值,最后对自营店引入前后的模型结果进行比较。研究表明,在对称信息和非对称信息下,零售商在零售店中的努力水平始终不超过制造商在自营店中的努力水平;制造商通过引入自营店可以获得额外的期望收益,并且产出系数越大、努力成本越低,制造商所获得的额外期望收益越多。In this paper we first formulated the remuneration and incentive mechanism model for the supply chain consisting of a manufac-turer, a retailer and self-operated stores with symmetric and non-symmetric information respectively, then analyzed the remuneration and in- eentive mechanism when there are self-operated stores in the supply chain as well as its information value, and finally compared/he model be-fore and after the introduction of the stores. We found that either with synnnetrie or non-symmetric information, the effort level of the retailer in a retall store would not exceed that of the manufacturer in the self-operated store; the manufacturer, by introducing the self-operated store, could earn extra expected benefit which is greater with bigger output coefficient and lower effort cost.

关 键 词：供应链 薪酬激励机制 自营店 努力水平 信息对称 

分 类 号：F272.923[经济管理—企业管理]