家族企业与职业经理人的信任博弈分析  

Analysis of Trust Game between the Family Firms and Professional Managers

作　　者：叶素文[1] 

机构地区：[1]浙江万里学院,浙江宁波315100

出　　处：《浙江万里学院学报》2012年第4期1-7,共7页Journal of Zhejiang Wanli University

摘　　要：文章借鉴国内外委托代理理论的研究成果,改造了代理人效率工资中的部分假设,增加了基于信任的"制度化收益"及"匹配收益"两个影响因素,完善了家族企业职业经理人三阶段信任博弈模型。研究表明,家族企业信任关系具有外部性,信任制度的合理设计并有效运用是保障职业经理人制度实施效率的关键因素。This article learns from the foreign research of trust relationship＇s dynamic game. With regards to the game model of efficiency wage, this article adds two factors, ＂institutionalization of income＂ and ＂match income＂ which are on the basis of trust. Therefore, it improved three-stage trust game model of family firm＇s professional managers. This study showed that the trust relationship of family firm has externalities. A well-designed of trust institution and its effective application are the key factors to protect the operational efficiency of the professional manager System.

关 键 词：家族企业 职业经理人 信任博弈 

分 类 号：C93[经济管理—管理学]