子公司绩效目标虚减操纵行为与激励机制对策研究  

Research on Subsidiaries' Behavior of Intentionally Decreasing Performance Target and the Design of Incentive Mechanism

作　　者：罗彪[1] 李嘉玲[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国科学技术大学管理学院,安徽合肥230026

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2012年第4期125-135,共11页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金委青年科学基金项目(70802058);国家自然科学基金委创新研究群体项目(70821001);教育部博士点基金新教师基金(200803581007);安徽省自然科学基金委第五批优秀青年科技基金(10040606Y35)

摘　　要：企业集团总部与子公司在绩效计划阶段围绕目标值的设定存在博弈行为,子公司往往利用自身的信息优势虚减绩效目标,这种操纵行为将误导集团总部正常决策,影响资源配置效率并减少激励机制效用。本文基于子公司绩效操纵的委托代理模型与适应性预期假设,以两期收益为周期,按照激励相容的机制设计条件,对绩效目标的虚减操纵行为进行建模,分析指出子公司虚减操纵的条件触发因素和集团总部可行的控制方法,并据此提出企业集团总部相应的激励机制建设建议。In this paper,the game between enterprise group＇s headquarters and subsidiaries that affects the setting of performance target is analyzed.Subsidiaries often use their information superiority to intentionally decrease performance target.This manipulation,which reduces the effectiveness of incentives,will mislead headquarters＇ decision-making and affect efficiency of resource allocation.A principal-agent model of subsidiaries＇ deflated manipulation is designed based on adaptive expectations hypothesis and subsidiaries＇ two-period income.Then,the trigger conditions of subsidiaries＇ manipulation and feasible control method of headquarters are explored,and accordingly the corresponding incentive mechanism recommendations of headquarters are put forward.

关 键 词：虚减操纵 绩效目标 委托代理模型 激励机制 

分 类 号：F276[经济管理—企业管理] C934[经济管理—国民经济]