国企高管过度投资行为控制机制研究——基于过度自信理论的分析  

Control Mechanism of Over-investment behavior of State--owned Enterprises Executives - Based on the Theoretical of Overconfidence

作　　者：曹晓燕 

机构地区：[1]江苏省电力公司镇江供电公司,江苏镇江212000

出　　处：《时代经贸》2012年第16期105-107,共3页TIMES OF ECONOMY & TRADE

摘　　要：国企高管作为投资决策的核心人员，在投资决策过程中存在非理性的现象。论文从过度自信理论对国企高管过度投资行为的动因进行了分析，并在此基础上从个人层面和公司层面提出了国企高管人员过度投资行为控制机制，包括区分决策和行动、构建自我学习机制、董事会内部治理和心理契约的使用等。As core staff of the investment decision-making, executives of the state-owned enterprises may be non-rationality in the investment decision-making process. The paper analyze the motivation of the over-investment behavior of state-owned enterprises executives based on theory of overconfidence, and the over-investment behavioral control mechanisms including distinction between decisions and actions, building self-learning mechanism, the internal governance of the Board, and use of the psychological contract from personal level and corporate level are analyzed.

关 键 词：国企高管 过度投资 控制机制 过度自信 

分 类 号：F279.246[经济管理—企业管理]