金字塔结构、在职消费与公司价值——来自中国上市公司的经验证据  

Pyramid Structure,Executive Perks and Coporate Value——Empirical Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies

作　　者：梁彤缨[1] 冯莉[1] 陈修德[2] 

机构地区：[1]华南理工大学工商管理学院,广东广州510641 [2]广东工业大学管理学院,广东广州510520

出　　处：《山西财经大学学报》2012年第11期75-83,共9页Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学规划基金项目(11YJA630053);广东省软科学研究计划项目(2010B070300022)

摘　　要：本文研究金字塔结构对在职消费程度的影响。运用我国上市公司2004～2009年的面板数据固定效应回归模型,研究发现:(1)金字塔结构的层级越多,在职消费程度越高,而金字塔结构控制链条数越多,在职消费越可以得到有效抑制,这一结论在非国有企业尤为显著,对国有企业在职消费的影响并不明显;(2)不论在非国有企业还是国有企业,当终极控制人对上市公司的金字塔控制层级多于控制链条数时,在职消费与公司业绩负相关,反之在职消费与公司业绩显著正相关。本文的研究结论,为上市公司终极控制链的改革以及控制策略的调整提供了重要的实证依据与理论启示。This paper studies the impact of the pyramid structure on the executive perks.Using the panel data fixed effects regression model of Chinese listed companies from 2004 to 2009,the study finds： when the levels of pyramid structure is more,the degree of the perks will be higher,and when the control chain of pyramid structure is more,executive perks can be effectively significantly inhibited,especially in the non-state-owned enterprises.At the same time,when the number of the pyramid level is more than the control chain,perks are negatively related with firm performance,and when the pyramid level is less than or equal to the control chain,perks can significantly improve coporate value.This conclusion provides important empirical evidence and theoretical inspiration for the reform of the ultimate control chain and the adjustment of the listed companies＇ control strategy.

关 键 词：金字塔结构 终极产权 在职消费 公司价值 

分 类 号：F273[经济管理—企业管理]