双重委托代理关系下的公司治理模式选择——基于广东家族上市公司的分析  

Options of Corporate Management Model under Dual Entrusting Agency Relationship——Analysis based on listed family business of Guangdong Province

作　　者：张宏博[1] 陈创练[2] 

机构地区：[1]番禺职业技术学院财经系,广东广州511483 [2]厦门大学金融系,福建厦门361005

出　　处：《广东培正学院学报》2008年第4期23-27,31,共6页Journal of Guangdong Peizheng College

基　　金：广东省社科规划办课题的阶段性成果之一(编号:04CC103)

摘　　要：在研究了广东在深市上市的50家家族企业后发现,交叉持股企业比金字塔结构企业更倾向于控制企业,家族参与经营管理企业的控股股东比家族不参与经营管理企业的控股股东更加偏向于控制企业。在企业采取不同的管理模式中,平均而言,所有权与经营权两权完全分离的经营管理模式下的公司绩效最好,而对于企业聘用职业经理人但家族掌握经营权的企业管理模式下的企业,由于企业的实际控制人与职业经理人之间的委托代理成本很大,公司绩效最差。After analyzing data of 50 listed corporations of Guangdong family listed corporation in Shenzhen Stock Exchange, the authors found than pyramid-structured enterprises tend to exert control over the corporation in comparison to cross-shareholding corporations. The shareholders participating in managing incline to control the enterprises comparing with those shareholders who do not. For different management modes adopted by enterprises, at average, the corporation performance is the best under the mode of separating ownership and operation rights. On the other hand, the corporations’ performance are the worse under the mode of hiring profes-sional manager, but controlling the operation rights at families’ hands. The basic reason lies in the high cost of entrusting agency between enterprise real controller and professional manager.

关 键 词：委托代理 金字塔持股 家族企业 

分 类 号：F276.5[经济管理—企业管理]