在职消费与融资约束——基于中国上市公司的实证研究  

Non-pecuniary Compensation and Financial Constraint:Based on the Empirical Analysis of Chinese Listed Companies

作　　者：及晶晶[1] 张顺明[2] 

机构地区：[1]厦门大学经济学院 [2]中国人民大学财政金融学院

出　　处：《投资研究》2012年第10期37-50,共14页Review of Investment Studies

基　　金：国家杰出青年科学基金项目(批准号:70825003)的资助

摘　　要：基于目前对在职消费的经济后果研究不足的现实,本文在激励约束理论的框架下构建了关于在职消费与融资约束的理论模型,认为由于在职消费可以带来私人收益而引致道德风险,从而影响企业的融资条件。本文利用中国上市公司从1998年到2006年的面板数据对模型进行了实证研究,并采用基于后果的随机前沿度量方法对融资约束进行度量。实证结果表明,具有较高在职消费的企业受到的融资约束程度较高,并且该类型企业的融资约束财富临界值也较高。Since the research is relatively scarce on the economic effect of non-Pecuniary compensation , This paper constructs a model with non-pecuniary compensation and financial constraint included under the frame of incentive constraint theory. Considering the moral hazards induced by the private benefit adhered to non-pecuniary compensation, the model demonstrates that the financial constraints in different types of companies will be defferent. In addition, this paper uses financial panel data of Chinese listed companies between 1998 and 2006 to conduct the empirical analysis, with the application of the stochastic frontier measure of financing constraints based on the economic consequences. The result shows those companies with higher non-pecuniary compensation are confronted with more severe financial constraints, and have to take higher critical values of financial constraints.

关 键 词：在职消费 融资约束 激励理论 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理] F224[经济管理—国民经济]