独立董事辞职行为的信号传递效应  

Signal Transfer Effect of the Resignation of Independent Directors

作　　者：王性玉[1] 彭宇 

机构地区：[1]河南大学管理科学与工程研究所,开封475001 [2]中国证监会河南监管局,郑州450000

出　　处：《管理评论》2012年第12期31-39,83,共10页Management Review

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金(12YJA790139);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金(12YJC790177);河南大学省部共建项目(SBGJ090211)

摘　　要：上市公司质量好坏的信息对投资者而言是不对称的,但独立董事的辞职行为会或多或少地揭示公司的运营状况。本文通过建立信号传递博弈模型,分析独立董事辞职行为传递上市公司经营质量信号的作用机理。结果表明,如果独立董事的薪酬状况在合理的范围之内,其辞职行为会形成投资者判断上市公司质量好坏的分离均衡和准分离均衡。同时,本文运用事件研究法对独立董事辞职行为的市场反应进行实证检验,发现其辞职行为对公司股价有显著为负的影响,独立董事薪酬的高低是影响股价异常波动的主要因素。但这种影响持续的时间较短,随着时间的推移,投资者对这一事件的反应会逐渐趋于平淡,遗忘期约在20个交易日左右。The information about the quality of listed companies is asymmetric among investors, but the resignation of independent directors can somehow reveal the company＇s operating conditions. This paper analyzes, by using an information signaling model, the mechanism of how independent directors＇ resignation transfers signal of the company＇s quality. The results show that if the remuneration of independent directors is in reasonable limits, it will form separated equilibrium and semi-separated equilibrium that investors can use to judge the quality of listed companies. In addition, this paper makes empirical study on market effect of the resignation of independent directors using event study methodology and concludes that the resignation has a negative impact on share price and the level of remuneration is an important factor which affects abnormal fluctuations of share price. However, the duration of effect is short. As time goes by, the effect on investors will gradually become dull in about 20 trading days.

关 键 词：独立董事 辞职 信号传递 市场效应 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理] F832.51[经济管理—国民经济] F224.32