股东监督、薪酬契约有效性与在职消费-基于国有企业经理人“59岁现象”的研究  

Shareholder Monitoring,Compensation Contract Efficiency,and Perks-A Study on the"Age 59 Phenomenon"among SOE Managers

作　　者：万华林[1] 陈信元[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海立信会计学院立信会计研究院/会计与财务学院,201620

出　　处：《中国会计与财务研究》2012年第4期111-174,共64页China Accounting and Finance Review

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年项目(项目编号:71102013);国家社会科学基金一般项目(项目编号:10XIL0012)的阶段性成果;教育部人文社会科学研究基金项目(项目编号:10YJC790242和12YJA790197);上海市教育委员会重点学科建设项目(编号:151701);科研创新?重点项目(编号:11ZS187和11ZS85);上海市曙光计划项目(项目编号:10SG541资助

摘　　要：基于我国国有企业经理人特有的“59岁现象”，本文从股东监督和薪酬契约角度研究了经理人缺乏职业前景激励时在职消费的变化。研究发现，就全样本而言，我国国有企业经理人退休前在职消费并非显著更高。分样本研究表明：（1）超额薪酬高并不能降低经理人在职消费；（2）当经理人在股东单位兼职，从而导致股东单侮缺乏监督的独立性；或者薪酬弹性缺乏、持股强度不足时，面临退休的国有企业经理人在职消费显著更高。本文的研究发现，不仅有助于丰富经理人激励的相关文献；同时，对我国国有企业经理人激励与监督制度建设亦具有重要的政策意义。With reference to the unique ＂age 59 phenomenon＂ among managers of Chinese state- owned enterprises （SOEs）, this article studies the change in perks from the perspectives of shareholder monitoring and compensation contracts when managers are not concerned about their career. The study finds that in the full sample, there is no evidence to show that perks are significantly higher in Chinese SOEs before a manager＇s retirement. The subsample study shows that （1） excessive compensation does not help to reduce perks; （2） a manager who concurrently takes a post in a shareholder＇s entity weakens the independence of shareholder monitoring, and perks increase remarkably before a manager＇s retirement when there is a lack of compensation elasticity and inadequate shareholder monitoring. Our findings not only enrich the literature on managerial incentives but also provide important political implications regarding the construction of an incentive and monitoring system for managers of Chinese SOEs.

关 键 词：股东监督 薪酬契约有效性 在职消费 国有企业 “59岁现象” 

分 类 号：F241.2[经济管理—劳动经济] F272[经济管理—国民经济]