无固定期限劳动合同与劳资行为的匹配研究——实验经济学与行为经济学的视角  

A Study on Open-ended Employment Contracts and Contracting Parties' Behavior Matching——In the View of Experimental Economics & Behavioral Economics

作　　者：王光荣[1,2] 李建标[3] 

机构地区：[1]潍坊学院经济管理学院,山东潍坊261061 [2]南开大学经济学院,天津300071 [3]南开大学中国公司治理研究院,天津300071

出　　处：《经济管理》2013年第2期155-164,共10页Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目"新生代员工的偏好与信念特质--基于行为经济学视角和实验经济学方法的研究"(71172068);长江学者和创新团队发展计划资助项目(PCSIRT);教育部人文社科规划基金项目"社会偏好;雇佣保护与劳动契约行为:基于比较制度实验的研究"(12YJA790133)

摘　　要：劳动合同法强化了无固定期限劳动合同管理,用比较制度实验方法研究外生的制度变量与劳资双方当事人的行为匹配,设置三种劳动力市场,用以检验无固定期限劳动合同不准解雇和可以解雇等不同制度安排对劳资双方的影响。主要发现:(1)无固定期限劳动合同的法定实施与劳资双方的行为匹配受制于偏好的二重性,匹配结果介于"赢"与"输"之间,并不是争论者强调的非此即彼情形;(2)若没有无固定期限劳动合同的限制,企业对合同类型的偏好是无差异的,无固定期限劳动合同导致企业偏好长期合同;(3)企业提供的工资基本稳定,高于自利模型的预测水平,且工资水平越高,员工的努力程度也越高,这验证了效率工资理论;(4)自利偏好的员工的机会主义行为明显,他们利用无固定期限劳动合同套牢企业,赚取准租金。解雇的威胁激励员工提供更高的努力水平,而无固定期限劳动合同却降低了就业福祉的匹配效率。Employment protection legislation （EPL） is an important policy in the labor market, and restrictions on open-ended employment contracts is core content of EPL. Employment Contracts Law of China carried out in 2008 also enhances employment protection such as clarifying the situations of signing open-ended employment con-tracts, but this induces debates on Employment Contracts Law. There are mainly contradictory views： supportive and opposite. Some researchers concluded conflicts came from dual labor market by analyzing logic approach of different views. Except dual labor market, we should focus on preference heterogeneity in a great deal. In fact, conflicts of contradictory views come from the dualism of preference. The logic of opposite views highlights self-interest prefer-ence, while the logic of supportive views highlights social preference. Actually, self-interest preference and social preference are mixed and unstable. So only emphasizing extreme forms of preference is problematic. Based on preference heterogeneity and parallelism of experimental economics, we experimentally explore how open-ended employment contracts affect parties of labor contracts and matching efficiency. Our study is based on the legal institution in reality, and at the same time we focus on the structure and hierarchy of the protection of em-ployment. We use gift exchange game to model labor contract relationship. A firm offers a labor contract to a worker, de- fining wage and desired effort level, and the worker accepts or refuses the offer. If the worker accepts the offer, a labor contract relationship is set up. Then, the firm can＇ t change the wage, but the worker can choose effort level voluntarily. The income of the firm is dependent on effort level of the worker. In our experiments, we design two kinds of labor contracts ： single period contract and 3-period contract. Sin-gle period labor contracts stand for short-term labor eontracts in reality, and 3-period labor contracts stand for medi- um or long term labor co

关 键 词：无固定期限劳动合同 实验 雇佣保护 劳资行为匹配 劳动合同法 

分 类 号：F247[经济管理—劳动经济]