不同产权性质上市公司高管薪酬业绩敏感度的差异研究——基于政府干预视角的实证分析  

The Difference of Pay-Performance Sensitivity between Different Property Rights of Listed Corporations: An Empirical Analysis Based on Government Intervention

作　　者：张兴亮[1] 

机构地区：[1]嘉兴学院商学院,浙江嘉兴314001

出　　处：《石家庄经济学院学报》2013年第1期90-94,共5页Journal of Shijiazhuang University of Economics

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(12YJC790274);浙江省教育厅科研计划项目(Y201122468)

摘　　要：以2007年—2010年中国A股上市公司为研究样本,研究宏观制度环境和对公司高管薪酬业绩敏感度的影响。研究发现:当不考虑政府干预时,民营及国有上市公司高管薪酬业绩敏感度不存在显著的差异;当考虑政府干预时,政府干预越多,民营上市公司高管薪酬业绩敏感度显著高于国有上市公司。研究结果表明,不同产权性质公司中薪酬契约的有效性或治理作用的差异,是由政府干预导致的。Using data from corporations listed in China A-share Market for the years 2007-2010, the paper studies the effect of macro system environment and micro arrangement of property right system on pay-performance sensitivity. The study finds that there is not significant difference in pay-performance sensitivity between private enterprises and state-owned enterprises when government intervention is neglected. However, the pay-performance sensitivity in private enterprises is significantly higher than that in state-owned enterprises when there is more government intervention. The research results show that the validity or governance function difference of compensation contracts between different ownership enterprises is caused by government intervention.

关 键 词：产权性质 政府干预 薪酬业绩敏感度 

分 类 号：F272.923[经济管理—企业管理]