家族企业关联大股东的治理角色——基于关联交易的视角  

The Role of Related Large Shareholders in Family Firms:A Study from the Perspective of Related Party Transactions

作　　者：魏明海[1] 黄琼宇[1] 程敏英[1] 

机构地区：[1]中山大学管理学院

出　　处：《管理世界》2013年第3期133-147,171,共16页Journal of Management World

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(批准号:71272202和70972075);广东人文社科基地重大项目(10JDXM63001)的阶段性成果

摘　　要：本文研究家族企业关联大股东的治理角色,以关联大股东对公司价值的影响为切入点,从关联交易的视角为关联大股东的治理作用提供证据。通过对2003～2008年家族上市公司的分析,发现关联大股东以关联交易为途径对企业价值产生负面影响。家族关联大股东持股越多、在董事会或董监高中所占席位的比例越大,家族企业的关联交易行为越严重,公司价值折损也越厉害。关联交易对公司价值影响不显著,关联大股东的持股和决策管理明显加深了关联交易对公司价值的损害效应。区别于由家族控股股东单一控股的家族企业,关联大股东的持股和参与决策管理为家族股东侵占中小投资者利益提供了更强烈的动机和更大的操作空间。进一步分析发现:不同类型的关联大股东在公司治理中的角色存在一定差异,机构投资者及"四大"审计师分别作为内部与外部治理机制,可对关联大股东的行为产生一定的监督和制约作用。In this article,we have researched the managing role played by the related large shareholders(RLS) of the family firms,and,taking as the starting point the impact of the RLS on the corporate value,and from the angle of the related transaction,have supplied evidences for the controlling function of the RLS.By means of the analysis of the family listed companies between 2003 and 2008,we have found that the RLS have used the related transaction as a way to produce the negative effects on the value of firms.The more the family RLS hold the share,the greater the proportion of seats in the board of directors or in the board representation the family RLS hold and the more serious the behavior of the related transaction of the family firms,and the greater the loss of the corporate value.The related transaction has no obvious impact on corporate values,and the share-holding and the management of decision-making of the RLS have noticeably increased the damage effect of the related transaction on the corporate value.Different from the family firms that hold shares only by themselves,the share-holding of the RLS and their participation in the management of decision-making have provided stronger motivation and more operation space for the familv share-holders embezzling the benefits of small and middle investors.By further analysis,we have also discovered that a certain difference has also exists in the role played by different kinds of RLS in the corporate control,and that the institutional investors and the Big-4 auditors as internal and external controlling mechanism respectively can produce a certain function of supervision of and limitation to the behavior of the RLS.

关 键 词：家族企业 关联大股东 公司治理 企业价值 关联交易 

分 类 号：F276.5[经济管理—企业管理]